Why do hosting providers suspend accounts for malware?

Hosting providers like Bluehost detect malware at the server level (e.g., executable files or scripts sending spam). If they flag a 'malware_bin.txt', it means the infection is larger than WordPress and threatens the server's stability, requiring full deletion before restoration.

Why did my security plugin miss these files?

Standard plugins focus on modified WordPress core files or PHP injections. They often ignore non-standard executable or system files (like .inc, .bak, or binary files) hidden deep within vendor libraries or plugin directories.

How do you prevent hosting-level infections?

To prevent these hacks, you must restrict executable permissions on shared hosting, regularly scan non-WordPress directories, and use SSH-level monitoring. Do not rely solely on dashboard-level security plugins.

Can I just clean the wp-content folder to fix a suspension?

No. In cases like this Bluehost suspension, malware is often found outside of WordPress or hidden in core vendor paths. If even one file listed in the host's report remains, the site can be immediately re-infected and re-suspended.

WordPress Malware Case Study: Removing Hidden Executable Files After a Bluehost Account Suspension

A client contacted me after Bluehost completely suspended their hosting account due to malware detection.
Unlike typical WordPress infections, this case involved a large number of malicious executable files scattered across the hosting account, listed by Bluehost in a file named malware_bin.txt.

Bluehost clearly stated that all listed files must be deleted before account access could be restored.
If even one file remained, the account could be reinfected and suspended again.

This was not a standard WordPress cleanup. This was a hosting-level malware incident.

Initial Assessment

The hosting account contained multiple WordPress sites, and malware was detected in areas often considered safe, such as:

/wp-content/plugins/
/wp-content/themes/

For example:

jetpack/jetpack_vendor/automattic/jetpack-masterbar/src/admin-color-schemes/compat42x
bluehost-wordpress-plugin/vendor/newfold-labs/wp-module-solutions/includes/addtocart
all-in-one-wp-migration/lib/vendor/servmask/filetypes.inc

These files were not part of normal plugin or theme functionality.

A legitimate WordPress installation normally consists of:

PHP
JavaScript
HTML / CSS / SCSS
Images and media
Document files

Executable or random system-style files inside plugins/themes are red flags.

This indicated:

Malware existed inside plugin and theme directories, not just outside WordPress
Plugin-based scanners could easily miss these hidden files
Incomplete cleanup could immediately trigger reinfection

Why Security Plugins Failed

WordPress security plugins focus on:

Modified core files
Known plugin/theme exploits
Database injections

In this case:

Malware lived in legitimate plugin directories but used strange filenames (insert_hw, addtocart, filetypes.inc)
Some files were hidden deep inside vendor libraries
Others mimicked standard plugin assets (compat42x) to evade detection

Bluehost detected the malware at the hosting level, which is why WordPress scanners did not flag it.

Mandatory Step: Full Backup

Before removing anything:

A full hosting account backup was taken
All files and databases were preserved

This step is critical.
Mass deletion without a backup can permanently break websites or destroy forensic evidence.

Malware Cleanup Strategy

Identifying the Malware

From malware_bin.txt, I extracted approximately 50–80 unique malicious file names.
These filenames appeared repeatedly across different directories in the hosting account.

Each filename was manually reviewed to confirm:

It was not part of WordPress core
It was not used by any plugin or theme
It was not a legitimate application file

Only after verification was removal approved.

Why Manual Deletion Was Not an Option

Files were scattered across hundreds of directories
Many filenames appeared multiple times
Missing even one file could re-trigger the infection
cPanel file managers are too limited for this scope

This required a server-level, SSH-based automated cleanup.

⚠️ Warning: Advanced Malware Removal – Only Attempt If You Have Server Experience

This case study describes a highly technical, server-level malware removal process involving SSH access, filename loops, and manual deletions across WordPress plugins, themes, and hosting directories.

Do not attempt this if you are not experienced with Linux, SSH, or WordPress server administration.

Mistakes can lead to:

Permanent data loss
Broken WordPress installations
Re-infection of your hosting account
Possible hosting account suspension

If you are unsure, it’s strongly recommended to hire a professional to safely perform these steps.

SSH-Based Malware Removal Using a Loop

To ensure complete removal, I used an SSH loop that iterated through the list of malicious filenames and deleted every occurrence across the entire hosting account.

Simplified Example of the Logic Used

files=(
  "rvsMasterCompoDB"
  "phpthumb.unsharp"
  "currencyVars.inc"
  "cron.bak"
  "toolbadex.hacked"
  ".key-daemon"
  ".pulse-listener"
  ".sys-config"
  "bigocaptcha"
)

for file in "${files[@]}"; do
  find /home/username/ -type f -name "$file" -delete
done

This method ensured that:

All malicious files were located regardless of directory depth
Duplicate payloads were fully removed
No reinfection vectors were left behind
Cleanup was consistent and verifiable

This level of cleanup cannot be achieved using WordPress plugins or control panel tools.

Post-Cleanup Verification

After removal:

File permissions were reviewed
No unexpected executable or system-like files remained
WordPress core integrity was validated
Bluehost re-scanned the hosting account

The hosting account was fully restored.
No reinfection occurred.

Key Takeaways From This Case

Not all WordPress malware lives inside WordPress
Executable files in a WordPress hosting account are a major red flag
Hosting providers often detect malware that plugins miss
Cleaning only wp-content is not enough
SSH-level access is critical for serious infections

If your hosting provider suspends your account, the problem is often bigger than WordPress itself.

How to Prevent This Type of Infection

Restrict executable permissions on shared hosting
Regularly scan non-WordPress directories
Do not rely solely on security plugins
Harden hosting-level security, not just WordPress

Without these steps, reinfection is only a matter of time.

Final Note

If your hosting provider has:

Disabled your account
Sent a malware report you do not understand
Flagged executable or system-style files
Rejected plugin-based cleanups

You are dealing with a server-level or shared hosting malware infection.

This type of issue requires manual, SSH-based remediation, not automated tools.

For professional cleanup, reinfection prevention, and hosting restoration, you can reach me through mdpabel.com.